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Abstract
Neural networks have been shown vulnerable to a variety of adversarial algorithms.
A crucial step to understanding the rationale for this lack of robustness is to
assess the potential of the neural networks’ representation to encode the existing
features. Here, we propose a method to understand the representation quality of
the neural networks using a novel test based on Zero-Shot Learning, entitled Raw
Zero-Shot. The principal idea is that, if an algorithm learns rich features, such
features should be able to interpret "unknown" classes as an aggregate of previously
learned features. This is because unknown classes usually share several regular
features with recognised classes, given the features learned are general enough.
We further introduce two metrics to assess these learned features to interpret
unknown classes. One is based on inter-cluster validation technique (Davies-
Bouldin Index), and the other is based on the distance to an approximated ground-
truth. Experiments suggest that adversarial defences improve the representation of
the classifiers, further suggesting that to improve the robustness of the classifiers,
one has to improve the representation quality also. Experiments also reveal a strong
association (a high Pearson Correlation and low p-value) between the metrics and
adversarial attacks. Interestingly, the results indicate that dynamic routing networks
such as CapsNet have better representation while current deeper neural networks
are trading off representation quality for accuracy.
1 Introduction
Adversarial samples are noise-perturbed samples that can fail neural networks for tasks like image
classification. Since they were discovered some years ago in [52], the quality and the variety
of adversarial samples have grown. These adversarial samples can be generated by a specific
class of algorithms known as adversarial attacks [36, 6, 33, 50]. Most of these adversarial attacks
can be transformed into real-world attacks [45, 26, 4], which confers a big issue as well as a
security risk for current neural networks’ applications. Albeit the existence of many defences
[15, 21, 41, 12, 18, 10, 16, 48, 62, 32, 30, 8] to these adversarial attacks, no known learning algorithm
or procedure can defend consistently [9, 56, 3, 58, 59]. This shows that a more profound understanding
of the adversarial algorithms is needed to enable the formulation of consistent defences.
Few works have focused on understanding the reasoning behind such a lack of robustness. It is
discussed in [15], that neural networks’ linearity is one of the main reasons for failure. Other
investigation by [55] shows that with deep learning, neural networks learn false structures that
are simpler to learn rather than the ones expected. Moreover, recent research by [60] unveil that
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adversarial attacks are altering where the algorithm is paying attention. We try to open up a new
perspective on understanding adversarial algorithms based on representation quality. We do this,
by verifying that the representation quality of neural networks is indeed linked with the adversarial
algorithms.
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Figure 1: Raw Zero-Shot Illustration
Contributions: In this article, we propose a
methodology based on Zero-Shot Learning for
evaluating the representation quality of the neu-
ral networks. We conduct the experiments over
the soft-labels of an unfamiliar class to assess
the representation quality of the classifiers. This
is based on the hypothesis that if a classifier is
capable of learning useful features, an unfamil-
iar class would also be associated with some of
these learned features (Figure 1). We call this
type of inspection over unfamiliar class, Raw
Zero-Shot (Section 3). Furthermore, we also
introduce two associated metrics to evaluate the
representation quality of neural networks. One
is based on Clustering Hypothesis (Section 3.1),
while the other is based on Amalgam Hypothesis
(Section 3.2).
We evaluate our Raw Zero-Shot test and our two metrics over a wide assortment of datasets (and
classifiers) such as Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a customised Imagenet to assess the representa-
tion quality of the vanilla classifiers (Section 5.2). We also evaluate different adversarial defences to
prove that these adversarial defences when applied to a classifier give better representation quality
than the vanilla classifier (Section 5.2). Based on our Raw Zero-Shot test and our two metrics, we
then reveal a link between the representation quality and attack susceptibility by verifying that the
proposed metrics have a high Pearson Correlation with the adversarial attacks (Section 6).
2 Related Works
Understanding Adversarial Attacks: Since the discovery of adversarial samples [52], many re-
searchers have tried to understand the adversarial attacks. It is hypothesised that neural networks’
linearity is one of the principal reasons for failure against an adversary [15] and non-linear neural
networks are thus, more robust compared to linear networks [17]. Based on this understanding, the
authors of [8] proposed to discretise the input feature space, which may lead to breaking this linearity.
However, recent research proves that the input feature space itself is vast, which provide opportuni-
ties to the adversaries [62]. It was also observed that the classifiers are not familiarised with the
"adversarial" input feature space as adversarial samples have much lower probability densities under
the image distribution [48]. However, researchers also argue that adversarial attacks are entangled
with interpretability of neural networks as results on adversarial samples can hardly be explained
[53]. Intuitively thus, in [10] authors recommended discarding some of the information unnoticeable
to humans in input feature space by compressing as adversarial noises are often indiscernible by
the human eye. Another aspect of robustness is discussed in [32], where authors suggest that the
capacity of the neural networks’ architecture is relevant to the robustness. In this article, we explore
a new perspective to understand adversarial attacks and defences based on the representation quality
of the neural networks.
Zero-Shot learning: Zero-Shot learning is a method to estimate unfamiliar classes which do not
appear in the training data. The motivation of Zero-Shot learning is to transfer knowledge from
recognised classes to unfamiliar classes. Existing methods address the problem by estimating
unfamiliar classes from an attribute vector defined manually for both known and unknown classes.
The authors of [27] introduced Direct Attribute Prediction (DAP) model, which learns each parameter
of the input sample for estimating the attributes of the sample from the feature vector generated.
Based on this research, other zero-shot learning methods have been proposed which uses an
embedded representation generated using a natural language processing algorithm instead of a
manually created attribute vector [38, 64, 13, 2, 65, 7]. The opposite direction was proposed in [46],
which learned how to project from the source domain to the generated feature vector. Here, we use
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a modified Zero-Shot learning approach entitled Raw Zero-Shot to understand the representation
quality of the neural networks. Our Raw Zero-Shot is distinguished from other zero-shot learning
algorithms as in Raw Zero-Shot the neural network has no access to features (attribute vector) or
additional supplementary knowledge.
3 Raw Zero-Shot
Soft-labels
(N-1 classes)
Compare the 
histograms of 
soft-labels
Raw Zero-Shot 
Classifier
(N-1 class classifier)
Standard 
Classifier
(N class classifier)
Delete unknown class in soft-label 
distribution and normalise
DBI Metric: Clustering Hypothesis
Amalgam Metric: Amalgam Hypothesis
Single Class 
Samples
Histogram of soft-labels 
(H)
2D Soft-labels space
Class is 
unknown 
for the 
classifier
Class is 
known 
for the 
classifier
Histogram of soft-labels 
Histogram of soft-labels 
(H’)
Soft-labels
(N classes)
Visualisation of (N-1) dimensional 
soft-labels space in 2D
Figure 2: Illustration of both Raw Zero-Shot Metrics.
The Raw Zero-Shot is a super-
vised learning test in which only
N − 1 of the N classes in the
dataset are presented to the clas-
sifier during training. For train-
ing Raw Zero-Shot classifiers, all
the samples of one specific class
are removed from the standard
training dataset. The Raw Zero-
Shot classifier, thus, has only
N − 1 possible output in the
form of soft-labels. Please note
that a standard classifier has N
dimensions in the soft-label (z)
space. In contrast, a Raw Zero-
Shot classifier hasN−1 dimensions in the soft-label (z) space due to the exclusion of a class. During
testing, only the unknown class (excluded class from N ) is provided to the classifier. The output of
the soft-labels for the given unknown class is recorded. This process is iterated for all potential (N)
classes, excluding a different class each time.
Raw Zero-Shot Metrics are then computed over the soft-labels of the unknown (excluded) class to
assess the representation quality (Figure 2). These metrics are each based on a different hypothesis of
what defines a feature or a class. In the same way, as there are various sorts of robustness, there are
also different variations of representation quality. Therefore, our metrics are complementary, each
highlighting a different perspective of the whole. The following subsections define them.
3.1 Davies-Bouldin Metric (DBM) - Clustering Hypothesis
Soft labels of a classifier compose a space in which a given image would be categorised as a weighted
vector involving the previously learned classes, similar to our example in Figure 1. In our example,
the unknown class (Giant Panda) is represented as a combination of previously recognised classes
(Bear, Zebra, Bird) where the feature (body shape) of the Bear is associated with the Giant Panda.
Moreover, the feature (colour) of the Zebra is also associated with the Giant Panda. This is analogous
to how children describe previously unseen (Giant Panda) objects as a combination of previously
seen objects (Bear and Zebra). Thus, all the images of the class Giant Panda should have similar
soft-labels as the classifier can associate Giant Panda with some features of Zebra and Bear classes.
Considering that the cluster of soft-labels of an unfamiliar class would constitute a class in itself, we
can use cluster validation techniques to assess the representation. Here we choose for simplicity one of
the most used metric in internal cluster validation, Davies-Bouldin Index [11]. Hence, Davies-Bouldin
Metric (DBM) for an unknown class is defined as follows:
DBM =
 1
n
n∑
j=1
|zj −G|2
1/2
in which n is the number of samples (samples from unknown class), G is the centroid of the cluster
formed by the soft-labels of all the n samples, z is soft-label of a single sample of unknown class. A
lower DBM Score, thus, corresponds to a better dense cluster formed by the soft-labels.
3.2 Amalgam Metric (AM) - Amalgam Hypothesis
If neural networks can learn the features existing in the classes, it would be reasonable to consider
that the soft-labels also describe a given image as an aggregate of the previously learned classes
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(Figure 1). We call this aggregate, Amalgam Proportion which is used in our metrics. Similar to a
vector space in linear algebra, the soft-labels can be combined to describe unknown objects in this
space. From our example, the unknown (Giant Panda) class can be represented as a combination of
learned (Bear and Zebra) classes, where Giant Panda is associated with roughly 60% of the features
of the Bear class and 39% of the features of the Zebra class.
Differently from the previous metric, here we are interested in the exact values of the soft-labels to
determine the best aggregate to encode an unknown class. However, what would constitute the true
soft-label (Amalgam Proportion) for a given unfamiliar class still needs to be determined. To calculate
the true soft-label of a given unknown class automatically, we use here the assumption that standard
classifiers (classifiers trained on the unknown class or in other words classifier trained on N classes)
should output a good approximation of the Amalgam Proportion. This is based on the hypothesis that
the features that are learned by a classifier share some similarity with the unfamiliar class and the
classifier can associate this similarity in its feature space while evaluating these unfamiliar classes.
Therefore, if a standard classifier is trained in the N classes, the soft-labels of the remaining N − 1
classes (excluding the unknown class) is the validation Amalgam Proportion (Figure 2). Consequently,
the Amalgam Metric (AM) for an unknown class is defined as:
AM =
‖H ′ −H‖1
N − 1 where H =
n∑
j=1
zj , H
′ =
n∑
j=1
z′j
in which, z′ is the normalized soft-label from the standard classifier which is also the ground truth
(true Amalgam Proportion) for the image of the unknown class, and z is the soft-labels from the Raw
Zero-Shot classifier which is also the estimated Amalgam Proportion for the unknown class. A lower
AM Score, thus, corresponds to a better prediction of Amalgam Proportion which is closer to the
ground truth.
4 On Link Between Representation Quality And Adversarial Attacks
We begin our theoretical analysis by developing a framework, loosely based on the settings proposed
in [32, 22]. In the canonical multi-class classification setting, the goal of a classifier is to achieve
low-expected loss:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D[Lθ(x, y)]
for the given input-label pair (x, y) ∈ X × [[1..N ]] belonging to a distribution D where N is the
number of classes whereas a classifier in the robustness evaluation setting should have a low-expected
adversarial loss:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈∆(x)
Lθ(x+ δ, y)
]
where ∆ represents an appropriately defined set of perturbations that an adversary can apply to induce
misclassification1. It is stated in [22] that the adversarial vulnerability is a significant consequence of
the dominant supervised learning paradigm as we usually train classifiers to maximise (distributional)
accuracy on y.
To circumvent this bias towards supervised learning, we take into account the representation-of-
features z learned by the classifier. Thus, the expected adversarial loss as defined over representation-
of-features z becomes:
min
θ
E(x,z)∼D
[
max
δ∈∆(x)
Lθ(x+ δ, z)
]
The intuition to take into account the representation-of-features z is to analyse a classifier beyond the
paradigm of supervised learning and to analyse the association of this representation-of-features z to
an unfamiliar class. Note that as an ideal representation-of-features is not defined for an unfamiliar
class; therefore, we assess z using unsupervised learning evaluation.
Theoretically, any projection of the input in any of the feature space of the classifier could be used as
z to assess the representation quality of the classifier. Here, we use the final projection of the input as
representation-of-features z, as final projection is usually a reasonable estimate of the entire projection
1Here, we use the error in noise to be the adversarial loss instead of the worst-case error, for a discussion of
the relationship between error in noise and adversarial samples, please refer to [14].
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learned by the classifier. We use our Davies-Bouldin Metric (DBM) (Section 3.1) to evaluate cluster
of an unfamiliar class in representation-of-features space z by its intra-cluster distance. Further, we
also evaluate the relationship between representation-of-features z and an approximated ground truth
of representation-of-features using our other Amalgam Metric (AM) (Section 3.2).
5 Analysis of Representation Quality
5.1 Experimental Design
Considered Datasets. We conducted the experiments based on Raw Zero-Shot on three diverse
datasets to evaluate the representation of the neural networks. We used Fashion MNIST (F-
MNIST) [61], standard CIFAR-10 dataset [24] and a customised Sub-Imagenet (Sub) dataset for our
evaluations. The details of the customised Sub-Imagenet dataset is mentioned in Appendix A. Note
that, the number of samples (7000 for Fashion MNIST, 6000 for CIFAR-10, and roughly 13500
samples for Sub-Imagenet dataset) in the assumed unknown class differ with the dataset. We use the
samples from both training and testing dataset for the unknown class for experimentation because
we exclude these samples in the training process.
Considered Classifiers. To obtain the results on vanilla classifiers, we evaluate different classifiers
for different datasets. For the Fashion MNIST datasets, we chose to evaluate two different archi-
tecture types of classifiers, a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), and a shallow Convolution Neural
Network (ConvNet). For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we chose to evaluate a wide range of classifiers
such as Capsule Networks (CapsNet) (a recently proposed completely different architecture based
on dynamic routing and capsules) [44], Residual Networks (ResNet) (a state-of-the-art architecture
based on skip connections) [19], Wide Residual Networks (WideResNet) (an architecture which
also expands in width) [63], DenseNet (a state-of-the-art architecture which is a logical extension
of ResNet) [20], Network in Network (NIN) (an architecture which uses micro neural networks
instead of linear filters) [29], All Convolutional Network (AllConv) (an architecture without max
pooling and fully connected layers) [49], VGG-16 (a previous state-of-the-art architecture which is
also a historical mark) [47], and LeNet (a simpler architecture which is also a historical mark) [28].
For our Sub-Imagenet dataset, we chose two widely popular architectures, InceptionV3 [51], and
ResNet-50 [19].
Considered Adversarial Defences. We also evaluate the representation quality of some of the
adversarial defences for CIFAR-10, such as Feature Squeezing (FS) [62], Spatial Smoothing (SS)
[62] , Label Smoothing (LS) [18], and Thermometer Encoding (TE) [8]. We also evaluate classifiers
trained with augmented dataset having Gaussian Noise of σ = 1.0 (G Aug).
Considered Attacks. We evaluated all our vanilla classifiers against well-known adversarial attacks
such as Fast Gradient Method (FGM) [15], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [26], Projected Gradient
Descent Method (PGD) [32], DeepFool [34], and NewtonFool [23]. Details about the adversarial
attacks used are mentioned in Appendix B.
5.2 Experimental Results And Analysis Of Representation Quality
Table 1 shows the results of the Raw Zero-Shot metrics (DBM and AM) for vanilla classifiers and
vanilla classifiers employed with a variety of adversarial defences for improving the robustness of
vanilla classifiers for CIFAR-10. Table 2 shows the results of the Raw Zero-Shot metrics (DBM and
AM) for vanilla classifiers for other datasets (Fashion MNIST and Sub Imagenet). Note that, we
use mean of all the metric values for N classes of the dataset to be characteristic metric value for
a classifier. To enable the visualisation of the DBM metric, we plot a projection of all the points
in the decision space of unknown classes (N − 1 dimensions) into two-dimensional space for the
vanilla classifiers (Appendix C). We can also similarly visualise the Amalgam metric in the form of
histograms of soft-labels for the vanilla classifiers (Appendix D).
Broad Overview: According to our metrics (Tables 1 and 2) we summarise our results,
1) For CIFAR-10 dataset. CapsNet possesses the best representation amongst all classifiers exam-
ined as it has the least (best) score in both of our metrics. At the same time, LeNet is considered the
second-best neural network as it has the second-least (second-best) score for both of our metrics.
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Classifier No Defence G Aug FS SS LS TE
DBM
LeNet 0.54 ± 0.04 0.56 ± 0.04 0.48 ± 0.17 0.45 ± 0.15 0.39 ± 0.13 0.52 ± 0.04
AllConv 0.64 ± 0.08 0.64 ± 0.11 0.59 ± 0.21 0.56 ± 0.20 0.44 ± 0.15 0.67 ± 0.05
NIN 0.63 ± 0.09 0.64 ± 0.11 0.58 ± 0.21 0.58 ± 0.20 0.48 ± 0.17 0.65 ± 0.06
ResNet 0.64 ± 0.13 0.63 ± 0.14 0.59 ± 0.23 0.59 ± 0.22 0.50 ± 0.20 0.71 ± 0.06
DenseNet 0.61 ± 0.14 0.60 ± 0.15 0.56 ± 0.23 0.57 ± 0.22 0.51 ± 0.21 0.69 ± 0.09
WideResNet 0.58 ± 0.15 0.52 ± 0.23 0.54 ± 0.23 0.55 ± 0.21 0.42 ± 0.17 0.66 ± 0.08
VGG-16 0.61 ± 0.12 0.63 ± 0.12 0.56 ± 0.22 0.56 ± 0.20 0.51 ± 0.19 0.65 ± 0.05
CapsNet 0.43 ± 0.03 0.44 ± 0.03 0.39 ± 0.13 0.38 ± 0.13 0.38 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.07
AM
LeNet 473.97 ± 91.53 491.10 ± 84.92 429.56 ± 137.53 404.50 ± 90.53 392.50 ± 101.83 400.11 ± 95.89
AllConv 634.04 ± 22.01 639.39 ± 26.71 571.77 ± 184.66 534.96 ± 149.44 521.57 ± 150.31 590.91 ± 45.64
NIN 646.04 ± 16.40 651.94 ± 10.92 581.09 ± 191.16 551.55 ± 165.03 552.39 ± 168.52 620.91 ± 23.65
ResNet 654.90 ± 6.40 656.61 ± 4.82 589.55 ± 194.20 505.77 ± 120.16 538.53 ± 154.68 634.74 ± 12.43
DenseNet 658.21 ± 4.05 659.28 ± 4.18 592.64 ± 195.52 523.19 ± 113.68 540.31 ± 157.50 644.77 ± 8.49
WideResNet 660.00 ± 3.60 594.10 ± 197.11 594.20 ± 196.55 505.82 ± 113.56 542.77 ± 158.33 648.67 ± 7.80
VGG-16 645.86 ± 15.19 649.83 ± 11.12 582.56 ± 189.08 533.88 ± 144.35 533.93 ± 153.55 608.25 ± 30.03
CapsNet 386.02 ± 82.02 383.92 ± 72.53 425.73 ± 156.14 418.17 ± 180.07 380.23 ± 119.27 857.40 ± 198.97
Table 1: Mean and Standard Devidation of DBM and AM values for different classifiers with and
without the adversarial defences on CIFAR-10.
Metrics Fashion MNIST Sub ImagenetMLP ConvNet InceptionV3 ResNet-50
DBM 0.51 ± 0.09 0.47 ± 0.10 0.56 ± 0.07 0.55 ± 0.15
AM 670.71 ± 81.79 683.55 ± 76.39 1335.65 ± 31.83 1311.97 ± 37.59
Table 2: Mean and Standard Devidation of DBM and AM values for different classifiers on different
datasets.
2) For Sub-Imagenet dataset. Both the architectures (InceptionV3 and ResNet-50) are equally
clustered and predict the Amalgam Proportion similarly. However, ResNet-50 has marginally better
representation than the InceptionV3 as it has better scores for both of our metrics.
3) For Fashion MNIST dataset. Interestingly, both the architectures (MLP and ConvNet) have a
similar quality of representation. While ConvNet seems marginally superior to the MLP in terms of
clustering the unknown classes more tightly (suggested by DBM), MLP seems marginally superior
to predict the Amalgam Proportion better than the ConvNet (suggested by AM).
4) For Adversarial Defences: Adversarial defences, in general, improve the representation quality
of the neural networks, either by creating more dense cluster of the soft-labels (suggested by DBM),
or by providing better prediction of Amalgam Proportion (suggested by AM), or both. Hence,
they are linked with the representation quality, and the results suggest that the current adversarial
defences improve the robustness of the neural network by improving the representation quality.
On carefully observing the metric values (Table 1), we found that our assessment of representation
quality also explains some of the propositions by other researchers, we highlight our key findings
below,
Why LeNet has better representation quality than other deeper networks? The fact, that LeNet
achieves a higher representation quality than other deeper neural networks such as ResNet and
AllConv may seem extremely unlikely. However, accurate classifiers can trade-off robustness for
accuracy [57, 42]. Our metrics suggests that this trade-off happens because the representation
quality of the deeper neural networks has worsened.
Does a model with high capacity will have a better representation? Our results reveal that a
deeper network which generally has a higher capacity [32] does not necessarily correspond to a
better representation of input features. As CapsNet and LeNet, which are much shallower than the
other deeper networks, are shown to have superior representation quality than other deeper networks.
How does Label Smoothing improve the representation quality? It is suggested in [35], that
Label Smoothing (LS) encourage the representations to group in tight, equally distant clusters. The
raw metric values for LS not only suggests that classifiers employed with LS form a tighter cluster
in soft-label space (suggested by DBM), but also the prediction of Amalgam Proportion is close to
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Classifier DBM with Mean L2 Score AM with Mean L2 ScoreFGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool FGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool
Fashion MNIST
MLP -0.20 (0.58) -0.17 (0.64) -0.17 (0.64) -0.04 (0.91) -0.02 (0.97) 0.82 (0.00) 0.26 (0.47) 0.26 (0.47) 0.83 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00)
ConvNet -0.24 (0.50) -0.30 (0.40) -0.30 (0.40) -0.26 (0.46) -0.22 (0.55) 0.83 (0.00) -0.07 (0.84) -0.09 (0.80) 0.81 (0.00) 0.82 (0.00)
CIFAR-10
LeNet -0.18 (0.61) -0.70 (0.02) -0.66 (0.04) -0.51 (0.13) -0.36 (0.31) 0.93 (0.00) 0.32 (0.36) 0.25 (0.49) 0.81 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00)
AllConv -0.31 (0.39) -0.56 (0.09) -0.54 (0.11) -0.10 (0.78) -0.30 (0.41) 0.67 (0.03) 0.42 (0.23) 0.41 (0.24) 0.94 (0.00) 0.73 (0.02)
NIN -0.56 (0.09) -0.57 (0.08) -0.57 (0.09) -0.42 (0.22) -0.43 (0.21) 0.78 (0.01) 0.84 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00) 0.96 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00)
ResNet -0.52 (0.12) -0.76 (0.01) -0.76 (0.01) -0.47 (0.17) -0.51 (0.13) 0.35 (0.32) 0.57 (0.09) 0.57 (0.09) 0.79 (0.01) 0.83 (0.00)
DenseNet -0.62 (0.06) -0.50 (0.14) -0.49 (0.15) -0.16 (0.65) -0.22 (0.55) 0.53 (0.11) 0.78 (0.01) 0.78 (0.01) 0.78 (0.01) 0.84 (0.00)
WideResNet -0.68 (0.03) -0.75 (0.01) -0.75 (0.01) -0.68 (0.03) -0.75 (0.01) 0.66 (0.04) 0.68 (0.03) 0.68 (0.03) 0.78 (0.01) 0.68 (0.03)
VGG-16 -0.62 (0.06) -0.21 (0.55) -0.20 (0.58) -0.52 (0.13) -0.63 (0.05) 0.71 (0.02) -0.04 (0.91) -0.07 (0.85) 0.87 (0.00) 0.74 (0.01)
CapsNet -0.71 (0.02) -0.45 (0.19) -0.49 (0.15) -0.39 (0.26) -0.48 (0.17) 0.98 (0.00) 0.69 (0.03) 0.73 (0.02) -0.17 (0.63) 0.47 (0.17)
Sub-Imagenet
InceptionV3 -0.76 (0.01) -0.52 (0.13) -0.52 (0.13) -0.35 (0.32) -0.50 (0.14) 0.75 (0.01) 0.14 (0.70) 0.14 (0.70) 0.28 (0.44) 0.25 (0.49)
ResNet-50 -0.34 (0.34) -0.12 (0.74) -0.12 (0.74) -0.54 (0.10) -0.25 (0.48) 0.82 (0.00) 0.31 (0.39) 0.31 (0.39) 0.51 (0.13) 0.50 (0.15)
Table 3: Pearson correlation value (and p-value) of DBM and AM with Mean L2 Score of Adversarial
Attacks for each vanilla classifier and attack pair.
the ground-truth (suggested by AM) than their vanilla counterparts. Thus, our results (suggested by
DBM) corroborate the results that LS encourage the representations to group in tight clusters [35].
How does augmenting the dataset with Gaussian Noise affect the representation? We also
observe that Gaussian augmentation degrades the representation quality of all the classifiers. This
supports our intuition (Section 4), as adding Gaussian noise to the images subdue the features of the
image by blurring making the classifier harder to interpret these features.
Does Thermometer Encodding breaks linearity in neural networks? Interestingly, the result of
the Thermometer Encoding (TE) suggests that when classifiers (except CapsNet) are trained with
TE, they tend to predict closer to the ground truth (suggested by AM). However, the soft-labels
form a sparser cluster (suggested by DBM) than the vanilla counterparts. This suggests that due to
the sparsity of input feature space created by TE [8], the output representation also gets sparsified.
This is expected behaviour since TE tries to break the linearity [15] of the classifier. Our metrics
suggest that TE breaks this linearity of the classifier to some extent by creating sparser output
representations.
Why CapsNet has better representation quality than other deeper networks? We believe Cap-
sule Networks has the best representation amongst other neural networks, because of the dynamical
nature (routing) of the CapsNet. Further, the use of non-linear squashing function [44] in the
CapsNet suggest that for breaking linearity [15] in neural networks; we do not have to compromise
on the representation quality.
Can we identify adversarial defences which work on the principle of obfuscated gradients
using representation quality? The adversarial defences (except LS) fail to improve the AM Score
for the CapsNet while improving the DBM score. This is expected since the adversarial defences
tend to make better representations, in general, than their vanilla counterparts by forming tighter
clusters of the soft-labels (suggested by DBM) and therefore the DBM results of the CapsNet follow
the norm. However, our intuition is that these defences fail to modify the gradients, due to the
dynamical nature of the CapsNet, as intended and end up predicting the Amalgam Proportion farther
from the ground truth (suggested by AM). Hence, this result suggests that these adversarial defences
which work on modifying gradients (obfuscating gradients [3]) fail to work as intended in the case
of dynamical classifiers, such as CapsNet and hence, can be identified with our metrics.
6 The Link Between Representation Quality And Adversarial Attacks
Since, the results in Table 1, suggests a link between the representation quality and the adversarial
defences as discussed above. It is intuitive to assume that there exists a link between the representation
quality and the adversarial attacks. To evaluate the statistical relevance of this link between repre-
sentation quality and adversarial attacks, we conducted a Pearson Correlation test of Raw Zero-Shot
metrics (DBM and AM) of the vanilla classifiers with adversarial attacks. We use the analysis of
adversarial attacks in the form of Mean L2 Score (L2 difference between the original sample and
the adversarial one) to compute the correlation. The Pearson correlations of the Raw Zero-Shot
metrics (DBM and AM) with Mean L2 Score is shown in Table 3 for every architecture and attacks.
Moreover, these Pearson relationships between the Raw Zero-Shot metrics and Mean L2 Score can
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also be visualised (Appendix E). We also analyse the impact of adversarial attacks on the correct
class soft-label (Appendix F).
The purpose of evaluating the Mean L2 Score as an adversarial metric is because the score effectively
assesses the impact of the adversarial attacks on classifiers. Note that, some of the adversarial attacks
may successfully perturb the same number of samples. Therefore, the effectiveness of an attack
cannot be justified with only adversarial accuracy. In our experiments, this is crucial as we need to
analyse the effect of the adversarial algorithm on each of the class of the dataset. Also, some previous
researches show that robustness differs across different classes of a classifier [40, 39]. Therefore,
here Mean L2 score not only determines the alteration in the adversarial sample, but it also analyses
the effectiveness of an attack across different classes.
The correlational analysis of our metrics suggests a strong relationship between our Raw Zero-
Shot metrics and the adversarial attacks in general. We do observe some anomalies in the Pearson
correlation with AM of BIM and PGD attacks for the ConvNet, and VGG-16 network and DeepFool
for CapsNet. These anomalies are studied in detail (Appendix E) to understand their existence. Our
analysis suggests that these anomalies exist due to abnormal behaviour of some classes. On careful
study, we note that for all the classes, BIM and PGD have similar Mean L2 Score. At the same
time, the representation quality differs for some of the classes of these classifiers. While for the
CapsNet, the Airplane class had very low Mean L2 score suggesting less perturbation to misclassify
despite a relatively close prediction of Amalgam Proportion to the ground-truth which was abnormal
compared to the other classes in the same setting. These anomalies further suggest that ground truth
Amalgam Proportion for some of the classes may not be inherently robust. However, the study of
these representation qualities of individual classes is beyond the scope of this article and hence, left
as future work.
On the other hand, DBM was shown to be related quite reasonably with the adversarial attacks.
This may be because it was shown that forcing a loss function to make features near to the feature
centroid is beneficial against adversarial attacks in [1]. Our metric DBM, as it calculates precisely the
closeness of the feature to the feature centroid, support the results in [1].
7 Conclusions
In this article, we propose, a novel zero-shot learning-based method, entitled Raw Zero-Shot, to
assess the representation of the neural network classifiers. In order to assess the representation, two
associated metrics are formally defined based on different hypotheses of representation quality. The
results suggest that CapsNet (dynamic routing network) has the best representation quality amongst
classifiers which calls for a more in-depth investigation of Capsule Networks. Also, results reveal
that classifiers employed with adversarial defences have better representation in general than their
vanilla counterparts suggesting that to improve the robustness of the classifiers, we have to improve
the representation quality of the classifiers too. Further, the strong correlation between the metrics
and the adversarial attacks suggest a firm link between the representation quality and adversarial
attacks. Results, thus, recommend that evaluation of the representation from both metrics (DBM and
AM) are linked with the adversarial algorithms.
Interestingly, our assessment of representation quality also helps to understand some of the investiga-
tions by other researchers in terms of representation quality stated below,
1. The trade-off between robustness for accuracy [57, 42] can be described with the help of represen-
tation quality.
2. High Capacity Classifiers [32] does not necessarily have good representation.
3. Label Smoothing encourages the classifiers to group in tighter clusters [35] (better representation)
and hence, contribute towards robustness and accuracy.
4. Thermometer Encoding breaks the linearity [8] of the neural networks to some extent by forcing
the classifier to create sparser output representations.
5. Adversarial Defences which are based on the principle of obfuscating gradients [3] do not work as
intended for the dynamical models.
6. Forcing the features to be closer to the feature centroid [1] helps in increasing robustness of the
neural networks.
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Hence, the proposed Raw Zero-Shot was able to assess and understand the representation quality of
state-of-the-art neural networks, along with the adversarial defences and link the representation quality
of the neural networks with adversarial attacks and defences. It also opens up new possibilities of
using representation quality for both the evaluation (i.e. as a quality assessment) and the development
(e.g. as a loss function) of neural networks.
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A Details About Customised Sub-Imagenet Dataset
Super-Classes Training Images Testing Images Corresponding Imagenet (ILSVRC 2012) Classes
Automobile 12981 500 407, 468, 555, 627, 654, 779, 817, 802, 866, 867
Ball 12971 500 429, 430, 522, 574, 722, 746, 768, 805, 852, 890
Bird 12990 500 7, 8, 9, 16, 22, 23, 24, 84, 94, 100
Dog 12904 500 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214
Feline 13000 500 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292
Fruit 12986 500 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957
Insect 12985 500 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309
Snake 12758 500 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64
Primate 12979 500 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374
Vegetable 12815 500 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947
Total 129359 5000
Table 4: Description of Super-Classes used in the Sub-ImageNet.
Sub-Imagenet is subset of the Imagenet (ILSVRC 2012) [43] dataset. It is intuitive for us to expect
that as the number of classes (N) grows, the decision boundary will become more complicated,
causing the classifier to smoothen the representation (Amalgam Proportion) more. Therefore, to
prevent this bias, we grouped a subset of 100 existing semantically alike ImageNet classes into
10 distinct super-classes, as described in Table 4. Our Sub-Imagenet dataset has some desired
characteristics for our experiments which are also similar to the CIFAR-10 dataset. These features
are:
1. It is relatively balanced dataset as other datasets used in the experiments. The dataset has a
mean of 12937 training images with a standard deviation of 80 images. All super-classes have
relatively the same number of images with a minimum of 12758 images for super-class Snake
and a maximum of 13000 for super-class Feline. Thus, the samples in the unknown class in our
experiments remain relative same.
2. Type of super-classes is similar to CIFAR-10, having six animal classes and four non-animal
classes.
3. Abstract Relationships between super-classes also exists similar to the CIFAR-10. The CIFAR-
10 have a Cat-Dog and Automobile-Truck relationships in which they are semantically similar.
Similarly, our Sub-imagenet also exhibits Dog-Feline and Fruit-Vegetable relationships. These
abstract relationships are important to validate our hypothesis of Amalgam Proportion.
B Details About Adversarial Algorithms
B.1 Experimental Settings
Attack For Fashion MNIST For CIFAR-10 andSub Imagenet
FGM norm = L∞,  = 0.3, step = 0.01 norm = L∞,  = 8, step = 2
BIM norm = L∞,  = 0.3, step = 0.01, norm = L∞,  = 8, step = 2,iterations = 80 iterations = 10
PGD norm = L∞,  = 0.3, step = 0.01, norm = L∞,  = 8, step = 2,iterations = 40 iterations = 20
DeepFool iterations = 100,  = 0.02 iterations = 100,  = 0.000001
NewtonFool iterations = 100, eta = 0.375 iterations = 100, eta = 0.01
Table 5: Description of Adversarial Attack Parameters
All the adversarial attacks used in the article have been evaluated using Adversarial Robustness 360
Toolbox (ART v1.2.0) [37]. We evaluated the test samples of Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10 and Sub
Imagenet datasets for the adversarial attacks. The attack parameters used for the evaluated adversarial
attacks are described in Table 5. Please note, that the adversarial settings were set such that the L2
score of the adversarial attack was preferred over adversarial accuracy.
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Classifier Adversarial Accuracy Mean L2 ScoreFGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool FGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool
Fashion MNIST
MLP 91.08 91.29 91.29 27.16 25.39 210.73 638.83 638.83 309.41 289.28
ConvNet 86.89 89.20 89.18 23.63 22.67 306.25 669.56 665.76 314.81 263.65
CIFAR-10
LeNet 84.58 89.12 89.25 31.70 84.12 152.37 345.27 357.34 132.32 49.61
AllConv 67.09 69.11 69.11 51.46 61.86 155.95 273.90 274.15 487.46 61.05
NIN 72.49 74.26 74.26 59.94 66.76 140.46 216.97 216.96 492.90 54.78
ResNet 52.75 55.41 55.41 58.71 54.39 124.70 164.64 164.64 458.57 51.56
DenseNet 50.78 52.11 52.11 60.83 50.81 120.03 160.34 160.38 478.03 53.89
WideResNet 69.59 89.42 89.44 60.10 82.73 159.88 208.44 208.49 613.14 63.13
VGG-16 82.79 94.97 94.99 65.08 92.43 181.29 321.86 329.96 651.65 77.01
CapsNet 70.02 82.23 84.46 87.40 90.04 208.89 361.63 370.90 258.08 1680.83
Sub-Imagenet
InceptionV3 85.76 87.24 87.24 86.94 58.44 796.53 1204.01 1204.01 609.54 319.73
ResNet-50 85.74 86.72 86.72 84.78 60.84 826.06 1264.30 1264.34 633.30 336.80
Table 6: Adversarial Accuracy and Mean L2 Score for each classifier and adversarial attack pair.
B.2 Results
Table 6 shows the Adversarial Accuracy, and Mean L2 Score, of different adversarial attacks for
different classifiers. Note that, the adversarial accuracy of some attacks (Table 6) differ from the
original published adversarial accuracy due to the change of parameters of the attacks mentioned in
Table 5.
C Visualisations Of Davies-Bouldin Metric (DBM)
Figure 3: Visualisation of the DBM results for vanilla classifiers using a topology preserving two-
dimensional projection with Isometic Mapping (IsoMap). Each row represents a classifier trained
with a label excluded whose projection is visualised.
Figures 3-6 shows visualization of DBM metric using Isometric Mapping (IsoMap) [54], t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbour Embedding (t-SNE) [31], Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS) [25], and Spectral
Embedding (SE) [5] respectively. The characteristic of IsoMap is that it seeks a lower-dimensional
embedding which maintains geodesic distances between all sample points that is it preserves the
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Figure 4: Visualisation of the DBM results for vanilla classifiers using t-Distributed Stochastic
Neighbour Embedding (t-SNE). Each row represents a classifier trained with a label excluded whose
projection is visualised.
high-dimensional distance between the points. t-SNE tries to model similar data points in higher-
dimensional space through small pairwise distances in lower-dimensional space. In other words,
it tries to minimise the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the two distributions of points in the
map. SE is a non-linear embedding, which finds a lower-dimensional representation of the sample
points using a spectral decomposition of the graph Laplacian Eigenmaps. It is to be noted that Isomap
(Figure 3), t-SNE (Figure 4), MDS (Figure 5), and SE (Figure 6) are different visualisations for the
same feature space z. The idea for having these visualisations is to investigate whether the cluster for
the unknown class can be segregated into one or more different classes. In other words, we try to
investigate whether there exists a single aggregate Amalgam Proportion for the unknown class or
multiple
The projections (Figures 4-6) of CapsNet is uniform and dense while the other networks have
more scattered non-uniform projections. The non-uniform projection, which can be split into
multiple clusters, of the other networks might suggest that the learned representation is not continu-
ous/homogeneous enough. Interestingly, LeNet have more dense and uniform projections compared
to other static neural networks, further suggesting the better representation of the LeNet. These
results are in accordance with the previous experiments (Section 5.2) on representation quality.
Another way to verify this interpretation is to look at the gaps in the projections, which is observing
the behaviour of different data points. For CapsNet, even if we form clusters to have different classes,
the gaps between the classes will be too small relative to other architectures. It also shows that
in the high-dimensional space, all the soft-labels are moderately close to each other, also verified
using Amalgam Metric (Table1 and Figure 7). While for the other architectures, there exist some
points which can form their separate cluster and be termed as a different class. Hence, for these
architectures, it can have one or more different Amalgam proportion for the same unknown class
which is contradicting to our hypothesis that there should exist only a single Amalgam proportion for
a single unknown class. Note that, this dense projection does not necessarily mean that the unknown
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Figure 5: Visualisation of the DBM results for vanilla classifiers using Multi Dimensional Scaling
(MDS). Each row represents a classifier trained with a label excluded whose projection is visualised.
class has converged to a single known class. It gives a visualisation that the Amalgam Proportion of
the unknown class is similar.
D Visualisation Of Amalgam Metric (AM)
To enable the visualisation of the Amalgam Metric, the computed histograms (H andH) is plotted for
every class and classifier (Figure 7). It is interesting to note that the histograms of CapsNet (Figure
7) are different from the other ones, as architecture employed by CapsNet is entirely different. This
reveals that this metric can capture such representation differences. It can be noted (Figure 7) that for
most classes of CapsNet, the variation is relatively low than the other architectures. This contributes
to having a good representation of CapsNet.
A further study can also be carried out to analyse the characteristics of representation of the neural
network, which makes a class more robust than the other classes. Further investigations can be also
be carried out to analyse the effect of a class for an adversarial attack based on this. This can also
provide insight into the classes which are robust to adversarial attacks. However, these analyses are
out of scope for the current article, and hence, left for future work.
E Visualisation Of Pearson Correlation
Here, we visualise the Pearson correlation between the Raw Zero-Shot metrics (DBM and AM) with
the adversarial metrics (Adversarial Accuracy and Mean L2 Score) mentioned in Tables 3. Figures 8
and 9, visualizes the relationship of Raw Zero-Shot metrics with adversarial metrics. In the Section 6,
we observed some anomalies in the Pearson correlation values (Table 3). Here we try to understand
these anomalies with the help of our visualisation (Figure 9). On visualising the pearson correlation,
we identify that DeepFool attacks the Airplane class of CapsNet with much less L2 score compared
to the other classes. This abnormal behaviour of DeepFool for the Airplane class causes the anomaly
for Pearson Correlation.
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Figure 6: Visualisation of the DBM results for vanilla classifiers using Spectral Embedding (SE).
Each row represents a classifier trained with a label excluded whose projection is visualised.
F Another Outlook On Link Between Representation Quality And
Adversarial Attacks
Classifier Confidence Score Pearson Correlation of AM with Confidence ScoreFGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool FGM BIM PGD DeepFool NewtonFool
Fashion MNIST
MLP 0.63 0.90 0.90 0.38 0.35 0.95 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.86 (0.00) 0.87 (0.00)
ConvNet 0.62 0.90 0.90 0.33 0.34 0.86 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.85 (0.00) 0.82 (0.00)
CIFAR-10
LeNet 0.58 0.72 0.72 0.12 0.48 0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.79 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00)
AllConv 0.82 0.91 0.91 0.71 0.69 0.92 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00)
NIN 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.78 0.75 0.94 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00)
ResNet 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.82 0.76 0.79 (0.01) 0.91 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.96 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00)
DenseNet 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.76 0.60 (0.07) 0.95 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00)
WideResNet 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.77 0.31 (0.39) 0.94 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00) 0.96 (0.00) 0.65 (0.04)
VGG-16 0.86 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.75 0.89 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) 0.95 (0.00)
CapsNet 0.17 0.46 0.48 -0.10 0.15 0.89 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) -0.52 (0.13) 0.24 (0.50)
Sub-Imagenet
InceptionV3 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.82 0.10 (0.78) 0.54 (0.11) 0.54 (0.11) 0.33 (0.35) 0.14 (0.70)
ResNet-50 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.85 0.81 0.44 (0.20) 0.75 (0.01) 0.75 (0.01) 0.67 (0.03) 0.53 (0.12)
Table 7: Confidence Difference Score and it’s Pearson Correation value (and p-value) for each
classifier and adversarial attack pair.
In this section, we analyse the representation quality from the perspective of Confidence Score, which
is defined as the change in the confidence of the true label by an adversarial sample. To further
deeply analyse the statistical relevance of this link between representation quality and adversarial
attacks, we here conduct a Pearson Correlation test of Amalgam Metric of the vanilla classifiers with
Confidence Score of the adversarial attacks. The Pearson correlation value of the Amalgam Metric
with Confidence Score is shown in Table 7 for every architecture and attacks. Table 7 also mentions
the Confidence Score of every classifier-attack pair. Moreover, similar to our previous analysis, these
Pearson relationships between the Amalgam Metric and Confidence Score can also be visualised
(Figure 10).
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Figure 7: Histograms of soft-labels (H ′ and H) from which the AM is calculated. Each row shows
the histograms of one classifier with one class excluded. Dark-shaded thinner and light-shaded
broader bins are respectively the soft-labels from the ground-truth (H ′) from the classifier trained on
all classes and the soft-labels of the classifier trained on N − 1 classes (H ′).
The purpose of evaluating the Confidence Score as an adversarial metric is because the score
effectively assesses the impact of the adversarial attacks on true class soft-label. This perspective
gives us the effectiveness of an attack on the soft-label of the representation, we evaluate. Therefore,
here Confidence Score not only determines the alteration in the representation space, but it also
analyses the effectiveness of an attack across different classes.
The correlational analysis of our Amalgam Metric suggests a strong relationship between our
Amalgam Metric and the adversarial attacks in general. We do observe some anomalies in this
Pearson correlation also with AM of DeepFool for CapsNet. However, we believe this anomaly is
due to the adversarial attack itself. Note that in Table 7 the Confidence Score of the DeepFool attack
for CapsNet is negative, which suggests that DeepFool instead of decreasing the soft-label of the
true-class, increases the soft-label of the misclassified class. We do note that, more investigations are
required to better understand the behaviour of Capsule Networks, in general.
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Figure 8: Visualisation of Pearson Correlation of Davies-Bouldin Metric (DBM) with Mean L2 Score
of adversarial attacks (Table 3). Here, the x-axis represents the Mean L2 Scores while the y-axis
represents the DBM values and each point represent a DBM value and Mean L2 Score for a labelled
class.
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Figure 9: Visualisation of Pearson Correlation of Amalgam Metric (AM) with Mean L2 Score of
adversarial attacks (Table 3). Here, the x-axis represents the Mean L2 Scores while the y-axis
represents the AM values and each point represent an AM value and Mean L2 Score for a labelled
class.
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Figure 10: Visualisation of Pearson Correlation of Amalgam Metric (AM) with Confidence Score
of adversarial attacks (Table 7). Here, the x-axis represents the Confidence Difference Scores. In
contrast, the y-axis represents the AM values, and each point represents an AM value and Confidence
Difference Scores for a labelled class.
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